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ABSTRACT

Determinants and Mechanisms
of Identity Shift in Tanzania

by

Alexander C. Wendt, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018

Major Professor: Dr. Anna Pechenkina
Department: Political Science

Since gaining independence in 1961, Tanzania has enjoyed high levels of national identification,
far higher than other states in east Africa. Yet, between 2005 and 2015, the Afrobarometer survey
recorded a decline in the national identity and an increase in ethnic identities in Tanzania. These
changes are striking because of the successful nation-building policies implemented by former
president Julius Nyerere. In addition, during the same period of 2005-2015, states bordering
Tanzania have increased their level of national identification. This thesis reviews the literature on
how changes in institutions, economic modernization, and conflict create incentives for political
competition that may in turn reshape identities. The preliminary results suggest that while the
introduction of the multiparty rule in 1992 in Tanzania created a more competitive and democratic
political process, it may have also brought about a longer trend of identity shift in the Tanzanian
population: the national identity has been declining, while ethnic identities have been rising.
(60 pages)
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Introduction
The 2015 Tanzanian presidential elections were the most contentious that the country
experienced since gaining independence in 1961. The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) candidate,
John Magufuli, won the election with 58% of the vote, while the CHADEMA opposition
candidate, Edward Lowassa received 40% of the presidential vote. Lowassa refused to accept his
defeat and initially did not concede the election; instead, Lowassa filed a petition for a recount.
While Lowassa’s recount efforts were unsuccessful, the Zanzibar election commission nullified
election results in Zanzibar due to “gross irregularities” (Ruling Party Wins Tanzania Presidency
2015). The 2015 Presidential election was the most competitive in the country’s history. This
election stands in stark contrast to many decades of popularity enjoyed by a single party, Chama
Cha Mapinduzi. While the introduction of the multiparty rule in 1992 in Tanzania created a more
competitive and democratic political process, it may have also brought about a longer trend of
identity shift in the Tanzanian population: the national identity has been declining, while ethnic
identities have been rising.
The Afrobarometer survey records a major shift in Tanzanian identity between 2005 and
2015. In Tanzania, the proportion of the population that identified as equally ethnic and national
increased from 6.1% in 2005 to 24.1% in 2015 (see Figures 1a and 1b). In 2015, the proportion of
the population that identified as national dropped to 57.8% from 75.9% in 2005. The increase in
Tanzanians identifying equally with their nation and ethnicity came at the cost of national identity.1
Why did national self-identification decline in Tanzania between 2005 and 2015? States that
border Tanzania are experiencing an increase in their national identity. Why is ethnic identity in
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In the 2005 survey round, the sample, size in Tanzania was 1,248. During the 2014–2015 survey round, the sample
sizes increased to 2,350 in Tanzania. While the new sample doubled in size in the 2014–2015 survey round, the
samples in the 2005–2006 survey round are large enough to be statistically sound. I do not believe the changes in
sample size can account for such drastic variation in the changes of ethnic and national identification.
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Tanzania becoming more important?
Figure 1-Figure 1a. 2005 Tanzania: Ethnic or National Identity 2

Figure 1b. 2015 Tanzania: Ethnic or National Identity

Figures 2–6 show the shifts in identity in states that border Tanzania. Across these cases,
there is a trend towards stronger national identification—other than Uganda, which exhibits no
shifts—making the decrease in national and increase in equal ethnic and national identity in
Tanzania more puzzling.
For instance, in 2005, 44.4% of Kenyans surveyed had an equally national and ethnic
identity. In 2015, this decreased to 40.1%. National-only identification increased from 24.3% in
2005 to 38.4% in 2015.
Figure 2-Figure 2a. 2005 Kenya: Ethnic or National Identity

Figure 2b. 2015 Kenya: Ethnic or National Identity

A similar trend but with less dramatic change can be seen in Zambia, where the proportion
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Note that x-axes in Figures 1a-6b differ. These graphs were obtained from the Afrobarometer survey. It is
necessary to look at the percentages on each column to see the true change in identification.
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of the population that identified with an equally ethnic and national identity decreased from 60.2%
in 2005 to 40.1% in 2015. National-only identity increased from 24.3% in 2005 to 38.4% in 2015.
Figure 3-Figure 3a. 2005 Zambia: Ethnic or National Identity

Figure 3b. 2015 Zambia: Ethnic or National Identity

In Malawi, the proportion of the population that identified with an equally national and
ethnic identity experienced no change. The proportion of the population that identified with an
equally national and ethnic identity was 47.6% in 2005 and 47.7% in 2015. National-only
identification increased from 22.9% in 2005 to 35.5% in 2015. “Ethnic ID” only decreased from
18.1% in 2005 to 10.5% in 2015.
Figure 4-Figure 4a. 2005 Malawi: Ethnic or National Identity

Figure 4b. 2015: Malawi: Ethnic or National

In Mozambique, the proportion of the population that identified with an equally national
and ethnic identity decreased from 40% in 2005 to 17.8% in 2015. National-only identification of
Mozambicans increased from 36.4% in 2005 to 52.7% in 2015.
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Figure 5-Figure 5a. 2005 Mozambique: Ethnic or National Identity Figure 5b. 2015 Mozambique: Ethnic or National

Uganda is the only state in East Africa that experienced no change in its equal identification
and only a slight increase in national-only identification. In Uganda, the proportion of the
population that identified with an equally national and ethnic identity slightly increased from
49.7% in 2005 to 50.4% in 2015. National identification increased from 18% in 2005 to 20% in
2015.
Figure 6-Figure 6a. 2005 Uganda: Ethnic or National Identity

Figure 6b. 2015 Uganda: Ethnic or National Identity

In summary, the states that make up East Africa, with the exception of Uganda, which saw
little change, experienced increases in national identity at the expense of ethnic identity, while
Tanzania experienced a decline among individuals identifying with the nation only. Furthermore,
national-only identification remains highest in Tanzania compared to the other states in East
Africa. The documented change in Tanzanian identity is possibly part of a longer trend; however,
due to data limitations I can only speak with certainty about the change from 2005 to 2015.
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This thesis asks why national self-identification declined in Tanzania between 2005 and
2015. To explain why this is an important question, I, first, provide a brief overview of the relevant
history of Tanzania. Second, I summarize why Tanzanian socialism, villagization, and the
emphasis of Kiswahili in education led to a high degree of national identification in Tanzania and
why the onset of the multiparty era may have undermined it. Third, I include the review of the
academic literature on identity, which focuses on three determinants of identity shift: institutions,
modernization, and conflict. Each of these determinants may create significant incentives for
political competition, which has a direct impact, as a causal mechanism, on identities. Finally, I
propose, to establish, through process tracing methodology, what determinant or combination of
the determinants created incentives for political competition, which in turn caused a shift in selfperceived identities.

Tanzanian History
Why does Tanzania exhibit the highest measure of national identity in East Africa? High
measures of national identity in Tanzania as recorded by the Afrobarometer survey have their
foundation in policies set by President Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union
(TANU) during the post-colonial period. President Nyerere and TANU created policies central to
building Tanzanian national identity, including Ujamaa villagization, rural development, and the
emphasis placed on Kiswahili as the official language of Tanzania. In this section, I briefly review
the post-independence period in Tanzania, which saw the creation of the strongest national identity
on the continent and a recent decline in the national identity, which motivates this essay.
Tanzanian Socialism

Shortly after Tanganyika received independence in 1961, the new state’s prime minister,
Julius Nyerere, resigned his post and retired to his village where he wrote four pamphlets. The
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most important of these was Ujamaa the Basis of African Socialism. Nyerere explained to the
Tanzanian people that while independence was a great success their work in uplifting the country
remained unfinished. Their goal was “full liberation, which could be achieved by self-help and
hard work” (Coulson 1988:136). The Tanzanian people saw Nyerere as a “mwalimu,” a moral
teacher who knows what is best for his people (Ibid). Part of Nyerere’s ideology was to fight
tribalism and other factors that would “hinder the development of unity among Africans”
(Abdulaziz 1980). This ideology included basing Tanzania around an “African nationalist identity”
where land provided to peasants for food security was a basic human right (Bryceson 2010, 73;
Scott 1976).
TANU, the Tanganyika African National Union, the political party that fought for
independence in Tanganyika; contested tribalism by dismantling traditional tribal authorities.
After making chiefs irrelevant, TANU then encouraged former chiefs to become party members,
wisely making sure TANU did not create enemies (Bryceson 2010, 74). Before independence,
TANU concluded that rule through traditional authorities like chiefs was not preferable (Iliffe
1979, 569). Some TANU leaders wanted to allow tribal councils to remain in power “to catch up
with other tribes which have made great progress” (Ibid). Nyerere feared that if tribal chiefs and
councils remained in power, it could lead to secession, with disastrous consequences. “We can’t
have another Katanga here”, Nyerere said (Ibid). During the Katanga secession, Katanga province
declared their independence from the Republic of the Congo-Leopoldville, causing a two-year
civil war. This is precisely the sort of event that Nyerere sought to avoid.
The 1967 Arusha Declaration explicitly stated the policy of TANU was to construct a
socialist state, and defined what socialism meant to TANU and thereafter the Tanzanian people.
Individual human rights such as freedom of expression were noted, but the role of the state is most
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striking: “To ensure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means
of production” (Coulson 1988, 176). The declaration continued, explaining that the state would
intercede in the economy of the nation to secure “the wellbeing of all citizens” (Coulson 1988,
176; Nyerere 1973). Even though the state would intervene, the declaration later notes that the
state cannot always provide the services that individuals would like; therefore, the Tanzanian
people must also be self-reliant (Nyerere 1973). Tanzanians would become self-reliant through
development projects sponsored by the state.
An important part of Tanzanian socialism focused on Pan-Africanist support for anticolonial liberation struggles in Africa, putting Tanzania at odds with the United States and Great
Britain during the Cold War. When “imperialist forces” in Africa fought against independence
movements, Nyerere used Tanzania as a safe haven for liberation groups. Mozambique, Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South African’s independence movements all used Tanzania as a home
in their armed conflicts against white minority rule (Otunnu 2015).
Nyerere corresponded with the Kennedy, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. In this
correspondence, he tried to explain why southern African liberation movements aligned
themselves with the Soviet Union and Cuba and not with the United States. African liberation
movements received arms from the USSR because liberation movements embraced a socialist and
not capitalist reform approach. Nyerere wrote to President Ford, “America’s interest in Angola, as
far as I understand it, is that Angola should not become a satellite or puppet of the USSR and that
there should be no military bases on Angolan soil which might be used by America’s enemies”
(Otunnu, 30). Nyerere tried to persuade President Ford that if America intervened against the
MPLA, then the MPLA would be forced into the Soviet sphere of influence. Thereby through
American actions, Angola would become a puppet of the Soviets and there would be a Soviet
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military presence in Angola, the very things the United States wished to avoid through their
intervention (Ibid).
Villagization and Access to Education in Kiswahili

Tanzania had extensive plans for development in rural areas, but these well-intentioned
plans were less likely to succeed due to demographic challenges. Before 1973, there were 11
million people categorized as “rural dwellers” throughout the country (Scott 1998, 229). Rural
peasants lived off subsistence farming and pastoralism. Thus, scattered villages prevented
development on a large scale. If Tanzanian development practices were to reach most people, rural
villagers had to move (Mwapachu 1976, 4). In 1962, Nyerere emphasized the necessity for village
life in Tanzania:
“If you ask me why the government wants us to live in villages, the answer is just as simple:
unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop
our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall
not be able to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or
have clean drinking water” (Nyerere 1967).
Nyerere’s goal was for people to come and live in Ujamaa villages, cooperate, be educated,
and learn modern agricultural techniques, thus alleviating poverty (Havnevik 2010, 38). The state
could not administer services to the people without “concentration into standardized units” (Scott,
231).
At first, villagization was gradual and voluntary. Nyerere made a point of warning
bureaucrats against the use of administrative or military coercion, insisting that no one should be
forced, against his or her will into the new villages, arguing that “socialist communities cannot be
established by compulsion” (Scott 1998, 231). Bureaucrats picked blank spots on the map of
Tanzania, where settlers were relocated. Economic logic was unimportant. TANU activists ignored
Nyerere's advice against compulsion, withholding famine relief from individuals unless they
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moved to Ujamaa villages, resorting to violence and intimidation, and even burning down houses.
At times, peasants moved peacefully but fled the new villages when they could. Brutal methods
were common, but Nyerere criticized the brutality even though he also wanted peasants to move
more quickly, “Despite our official policies and despite all our democratic institutions, some
leaders do not listen to the people” (Scott 236).
By 1973 Nyerere changed his mind and grew to agree that peasants did not know what was
best for them, stating “it may be possible-and sometimes necessary to insist on all farmers in a
given area growing a certain acreage of a particular crop until they realize that this brings them a
more secure living, and then do not have to be forced to grow it” (Scott 1998, 231). Compulsory
villagization began in earnest in the 1970s, overseen by Nyerere himself, who wanted quick results.
These planned villages differed from Ujamaa villages in that the former were nominally
voluntary, while the latter were compulsory. The state forced people to move, arguing that it was
in the people’s best interest. The purpose of forced settlement was about disorientation and
reorientation, disorientation by taking people out of their homelands, and reorienting them in new
villages, getting them ready for state services, and indoctrination. Movement into planned villages
was most importantly about political control (Scott 1998, 240; Geiger 2005, 285). Nyerere framed
compulsory movement by the people as a matter of life and death. The state would become father
to the people, thereby helping them lead a “prosperous life for themselves” (Mwapachu 1976, 3).
Agrarian and pastoral Tanzanians were averse to moving into their new villages set up by
the state. Since peasants resisted agricultural advice, resettlement was necessary to take them out
of their traditional environment (Coulson 1988, 162). Resettlement was harmful because farmers
and pastoralists had adapted their practices to the environment they inhabited rather than the new
environments found in collective villages. (Coulson 1988, 158; Scott 1998, 235). Resettlement
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centered on the view that Tanzanian peasants did not know what was best for themselves since
they were poorly educated. Reflecting this, the 1961 World Bank Report and the Tanganyikan
First Five Year Plan both note that peasants “are primitive, backward, stupid, and generally inferior
human beings” (Coulson 1988, 161).
Not all Tanzanians living in rural communities were forced to move though. Wealthy,
densely settled areas such as the West Lake region and Kilimanjaro were largely spared for three
reasons: (1) farmers there were already living in densely populated villages, (2) their undisturbed
production in cash crops was vital for state revenue, and (3) the groups residing in these areas were
overrepresented among the Tanzanian bureaucratic elite (Scott 1998, 236). Across the country,
those areas, from which more government officials originated, experienced a delay in villagization
and the overall process was better planned in those areas (Scott 1998).
David Laitin, in his 1992 book Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa,
begins with the hypothesis that leaders “have an interest in language rationalization” (Laitin
1992:9). Language rationalization is “the territorial specification of a common language for the
purposes of efficient administration and rule” (Laitin 1992, 9). “Efficient administration and rule”
were hallmarks of Nyerere’s rule over Tanzania by establishing Tanzanian socialism, resettling
rural peasants, and creating development programs once these peasants resettled (Ibid). These
policies used Kiswahili as a tool to bind the country together by educating the populace, because
the majority of Tanzanians were uneducated.
Nyerere advocated that the country needed unification during a 1962 speech to parliament,
stating, “I believe that culture is the spirit and essence of any nation. A country which lacks its
own culture is no more than a collection of people without spirit which makes them a nation” (as
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reviewed by Polome and Hill 1980, 145). In 1990, Nyerere reiterated his belief in the unifying
power of Kiswahili in Tanzania, saying:
“Making Kiswahili Tanzania’s language helped us greatly in the battle against tribalism. If
every Tanzanian had stuck to using his tribal language or if we had tried to make English
the official language of Tanzania, I am pretty sure we would not have created the national
unity we currently enjoy” (Laitin 1992, 92).
Tanzania did and does still experience and high degree of national unity, far greater than
that of other East African states. How did Nyerere and TANU change education and use Kiswahili
to create unity? TANU declared Kiswahili the national language shortly after independence.
Further steps taken after independence display commitment to the decision. First, all adult
education and literacy programs were taught in Kiswahili; teaching in other tribal languages was
canceled. Second, the National Kiswahili Council increased Kiswahili usage in all levels of
Tanzanian life. The National Kiswahili Council also encouraged writers to use Kiswahili in their
work, establishing standard Kiswahili. Third, Kiswahili was made the official language at all levels
of government. Fourth, all government workers were transferred out of their home region and were
assigned to other parts of the country, forcing them to use Kiswahili to communicate. This also
had the effect of making their children learn Kiswahili since they also were not in contact with
their parents’ tribal groups (Polome 1982, 173).
Part of the logic behind resettlement and Ujamaa villages was to reduce inequality in
Tanzania. Ujamaa villages brought people together and then bring government services to them
(Court 1976, 668). By resettling individuals, the state could educate children in primary school
and then use the same schools in the afternoon for adult literacy courses (Court 1976, 669). The
education system in Tanzania was revamped to reduce inequality, and education was made for
“mass needs” rather than “a small highly educated elite” (Court and Kinyanjui 1980, 57). The
government changed school curriculums to provide knowledge that they considered useful at the
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village level. This way, the relationship between schools and villages was symbiotic, with the
village sending students to school who would eventually help the village. Fostering a symbiotic
relationship between schools and villages also reduced regional competition. Schools could satisfy
village needs, reducing the number of people who needed to travel out of their home region to
search for national jobs.
Kiswahili-focused education efforts featured a high degree of political content. Creating a
national identity, ending tribalism, and educating the masses were all part of education that created
individuals who were deeply committed to Tanzanian socialism (Prewitt, Von der Muhll, and
Court 1970, 222). Political subject matter found in Tanzanian curriculum was designed to help
students develop some level of “political consciousness” (Court 1976, 670). First, individuals
needed to understand the level to which the state was underdeveloped and their place in
encouraging development. Second, citizens also needed to understand Tanzanian socialism and
how they fit into the system, which helped foster feelings of national pride. Third, political subject
matter sought to “foster a spirit of co-operative behaviour rather than individualistic” (Court 1976,
670). Using Kiswahili as the only language of instruction was a way to politicize students; it helped
individuals bond to the state since the use of Kiswahili was linked to resistance against colonial
rule (Geiger 2005, 281). Language choice, for individuals and for the state, was inherently
political.
Using Kiswahili in school and life was an expression of national identification and ensured
that individuals had a greater sense of national identification than under other circumstances (Court
1976, 671). Tanzania’s Minister of National Education explained:
“Our pupils are being oriented to our own mode of life and our own set of values, with the
emphasis on service to the community...The youth we take into our schools today will after
some years return worthy to take their places in their society-- and not only that-- they must
enrich that society and breathe new life into it, instill in it the desire for purposeful
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development and provide the necessary unified sense of direction for the whole country”
(Prewitt, Von der Muhll, and Court 1970, 222).
TANU fully expected their system of Kiswahili political education to foment strong
national identities that would benefit the entirety of Tanzania. Based on Afrobarometer survey
results, this seems to be the case. President Nyerere’s intention to build national identities in
Tanzanian citizens by urging rural development, Ujamaa villagization, and fostering Kiswahili as
the national language are key reasons why Tanzania is more stable politically in East Africa and
in Africa (Barkan 2000; Chaligha 2002).
Through institutionalizing the use of Kiswahili, the use of Ujamaa, and villagization,
Nyerere intended to modernize Tanzania. Nyerere wanted to create a dialogue through Ujamaa to
discuss economic and social behavior. The intention was to build the state that could rely on itself
and not on foreign powers and money delivered through loans and handouts. In addition to this,
Nyerere wanted Tanzania’s wealth dispersed equitably (Hunter 2008, 475-476).
During the single party era in Tanzania, TANU and later CCM’s goal was unity.
Consequently, civil organizations, political parties, and politicization of the civil service were
restricted until they did not exist. In turn, this created a society where people could not be critical
of the political system. Individuals were supposed to be passive bystanders (Makulilo 2012;
Babeiya 2012). This was all part of the effort to build national unity, bring peace, and encourage
development (Ibid). Nyerere argued that to fulfill his goals of nation building and economic selfsufficiency there was no room in Tanzania for ethnic distractions in their politics. Democracy left
too much room for different ethnic groups to use separation of power (as well as checks and
balances) to open space for new and different views from the state, which would then mobilize
political support for ethnic groups. Nyerere was concerned this would stop his unification and
development efforts before they could come to fruition. (Malipula 2014, 131-132).
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Economic Issues

Although Nyerere’s projects in the 1960’s and 1970’s did create nationalist unity the
Ujamaa centralized, economic system did not work. Nyerere’s efforts to modernize the state were
still limited due to his own mistakes and situations beyond his control. First, Nyerere had to deal
with droughts and famine within Tanzania during the time of villagization (Otunnu 2015). Food
shipments to the villages, which had been used to entice people to join the villagization schemes,
were cancelled, but the cost was too high. (Ibid). Second, CCM, (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the party
that replaced TANU), suffered from poor leadership at the local level (Ibid). Third, villagers left
their new villages or simply would not grow the crops provided to them by the government because
they would not earn much money in the world market (Ibid). Fourth, trucks were not available for
delivery of produce and there were not enough warehouses to store food for the villages (Otunnu
2015; Saul 2002, 194-199). Drought, productivity issues, the national debt, and war with Ugandan
dictator Idi Amin added to Tanzania’s economic woes (Heilman and John 2012).
Reforms and Multiparty Elections

Tanzania’s economic problems were large enough that President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who
replaced Nyerere in 1985, decided that Tanzania needed economic help. President Mwinyi could
get the economic help he wanted in exchange for liberal reform (Malipula 2014). The International
Monetary Fund and World Bank strongly encouraged Tanzania to undergo economic and political
liberalization (Bagenda 1994; Gibbon 1995; Havnevick 1993; Babeiya 2012). Reforms included
“the dismantling of parastatals, price deregulation, an end to pan- territorial pricing, currency
devaluation, the removal of input and food price subsidies, and the liberalization of trade”
(O’Gorman 2012, 316). The foremost reform impressed upon Tanzania was the change from a
single-party political system to a multi-party political system. At the time, eastern European
countries were experiencing changes to their political systems, embracing multi-party politics due
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to the end of the Cold War. Consequently, aid agencies used their influence to encourage
developing states in Africa to become multi-party states as well (Livig 2009; Villalon and Von
Doepp 2005; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Malipula 2014, 114). Multi-party states were thought to be
more competitive economically.
Support for liberalization and related reforms came from within CCM’s party as well as
from outside sources (Chaligha et al. 2002). Members of CCM formed a committee to end the
single-party system and some even say that Nyerere was instrumental in changing to a multi-party
system to avoid conflict in the country (Malipula 2014; Bangura 2006). President Mwinyi’s
Nyalali commission was formed to investigate the opinions and thoughts of Tanzanian citizens
about moving away from their single-party system to a multi-party system. The commission found
that only 20% of Tanzanians wanted to change to a multi-party system. Ujamaa had worked well;
Tanzanians thought that unity was equated with peace and a lack of unity would bring turmoil
(Chaligha et al 2002; Mailipula 2014, 115).
Since few ordinary Tanzanians supported the transition to multi-party elections, the change
is a top-down transition imposed on the country either by foreign non-governmental organizations
and then facilitated by CCM. The concern once again was that liberalization would “sow seeds of
class division where the rich due to their ability to pay received better services compared to the
poor” (Malipula 2014, 146). Nyerere preferred smaller “structural adjustments” that did not tamper
with his socialist vision for Tanzania. He felt the reform ideas that donors wanted instituted were
too capitalist (Malipula 2014, 101; Wangwe 2005). Socialism had failed in Tanzania, but Nyerere
was personally undeterred, saying, “although socialism has failed in Tanzania I will remain a
socialist because I believe socialism is the best policy for poor countries like Tanzania” (Mesaki
and Malipula 2011).
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Incumbent Advantage

In 1992, Tanzanian government amended the constitution through the Political Parties Act
to allow multi-party democracy in the country (O’Gorman 2012). Even though the constitution
was amended to allow for multiple parties, this did not mean that CCM would allow their hold on
power to be diminished. CCM elites managed the transformation of political institutions in
Tanzania to prevent their loss of power (Makulilo 2009).
After years of single-party elections, CCM had an incumbent advantage since they were
the only option for those many years. When political institutions were changed to allow new
parties, there were no foundational groups that new parties could draw supporters from. Trade
unions, human rights organizations, and cooperatives were nonexistent. Furthermore, Tanzania
has many different ethnic groups that represent small proportions of the population; consequently,
it is difficult for political parties to attract voters if they were to campaign based only on ethnic
considerations (O’Gorman 2012). New political parties must also try to unlink the ideas of peace,
unity, and Ujamaa with CCM. CCM the party was inexorably linked to the state (Makulilo 2012).
It is difficult to “untangle, both practically and in people's minds, the links which were so carefully
forged between the party and the state property, functions and personnel (Huntington 1991, 209).
Perhaps Tanzania is now experiencing the beginning of the unlinking of state and CCM ideology
in the minds of Tanzanian citizens.
The lack of higher education also plays a role in keeping CCM in power. Most Tanzanians,
especially rural Tanzanians, have never read the constitution, and “it is no secret that the average
Tanzanian suffers from a total ignorance of basic legal rights” (Ngware 1997, 246). The only party
that many people know is CCM, and when CCM is equated with equity, peace, and Ujamaa, then
what chance to other parties have? (Makulilo 2012). Even the constitution essentially codified
CCM ideology in Article 9, stating that:
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“The object of this constitution is to facilitate the building of the United Republic as a
nation of equal and free individuals enjoying freedom, justice, fraternity and concord,
through the pursuit of the policy of Socialism and Self-reliance which emphasizes the
application of socialist principles while taking into account the conditions prevailing in the
United Republic and for that reason, the state authority and all its agencies are obliged to
direct their policies and programmes towards ensuring… [That] “The country is governed
according to the principles of democracy and socialism” (Sulley 2012).
In summary, the unity and nationalistic sentiment that Tanzania enjoys is due to the efforts
of Julius Nyerere, TANU, and later CCM. Tanzanian socialism, villagization, and the emphasis of
Kiswahili in education engendered feelings of national unity among Tanzanians. In this Nyerere
succeeded, yet, the lack of economic development ushered in the multiparty era through economic
and political liberalization efforts of outside actors and Tanzanian political officials. Political
reform efforts and past programs have enabled CCM to maintain their control over the Tanzanian
political system. The changes seen in Tanzanian political institutions may be the early forces
behind Tanzanian identity shift as seen in the Afrobarometer survey.
The subsequent section discusses types and approaches to nationalism as well as the four
dominant theoretical schools that outline ethnicity related to this thesis.

Nationalism: Types and Approaches

In the previous section, I summarized the methods through which Tanzanian political elites
established a strong national identity after independence, which makes Tanzania’s recent decline
in national self-identification and a rise in ethnic self-identification even more puzzling. Before
proceeding to the discussion of how ethnic identities are constructed, this section briefly reviews
different conceptualizations of nationalism.
According to Anderson (1983), a nation is “an imagined political community-and imagined
as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 6). Imagined communities are a group of people, like
in a nation, connected by traits they have in common. These traits include language, culture and
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literature (Ibid). Similarly, Gellner (1983) described nationalism as “not the awakening of nations
to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist.” (p. 169). This definition of
nationalism emphasizes that any group of people larger than hunter-gatherers would be too large
to know all members of the society. Illeffe (1979) emphasized the interaction between the topdown and bottom-up approaches to nation-building, arguing that “no state, especially no colonial
state creates a nation. A state creates subjects. The subjects create the nation, and they bring into
the “process the whole of their historical experience” (p. 486).
Approaches to Nationalism

There are three dominant schools of nationalist thought: primordialism, ethno-symbolism,
and modernism (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005). First, in primordialism, nationalism is assumed. This is
because nations occur naturally simply because people live in groups. Nations are noted by shared
language, culture, and religion. Nations and nationalism are important parts of human nature,
because nations are primordial, feelings of devotion to a nation are expected (Ichijo and Uzelac
2005).
Second, ethno-symbolism is distinct but similar to primordialism since it focuses on ethnic
groups, where each group have their significant shared history. Nations in ethno-symbolist theory
are not fabricated. Nations develop; they materialize because of their people’s historical
connection. Their connection influences their future but does not necessarily predetermine it
(Hoggard 2016).
Lastly, modernism is the currently accepted approach to nationalism. Modernism contends
that, “nations and nationalism have appeared as consequences of the processes that mark the
modern period of social development” (Ichijo and Uzelac 10, 2005). During the eighteenth century
the modern state, industrialization, and increased literacy created nationalism. Traditions and
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values are often lost when nationalism takes hold. Nationalism is the substitute for the values of
the previous society. Nationalists like Nyerere, will invent new traditions, creating new “political
religion” (Ichijo and Uzelac 11-12, 2005). Nationalists may also remind their fellow citizens of
their extended past, closeness, values, and culture. Modernists would say this interpretation of the
past is not accurate. Anderson attributes standardized language to national cognizance (Anderson
1983).
All three aforementioned definitions are examples of modernism. Gellner and Illeffe’s
modernist definitions of nationalism are fitting for Tanzania, since the idea of the state was created
through the work of Julius Nyerere and TANU. Anderson theorized that the foundation for national
consciousness began when literature and capitalism took hold in Europe; languages were
standardized, and states unified. Language was the medium of transmission for national
identification (Anderson 44-45, 1983). Nyerere used Kiswahili in education in the same manner
in Tanzania. Since Kiswahili had no strong connection to any specific ethnic group in Tanzania,
the steady institutionalization of Kiswahili as a national language enforced nationhood relatively
equally among all ethnic groups in the country (Malipula 2014).
In summary, this section has summarized the current state of the literature on nationalism,
which prioritizes modernism as its primary approach. Modernism emphasizes national identity as
a social construct. The next section of this thesis reviews the theoretical schools that define
ethnicity as an identity category separate from national identity.

The View of Ethnic Identity as Sticky vs. Malleable

There are four major theoretical schools that define ethnicity: essentialism,
instrumentalism, social constructivism, and institutionalism (Varshney 2007). In this section, I
briefly review each of these theoretical traditions.
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Essentialism

The essentialist idea of ethnicity defines ethnic groups as “natural, inevitable, and therefore
unchangeable categories bound by a particular shared belief” (Malipula 2014, 58). In the
essentialist school an individual is the way they are because of established qualities that are
“inherent, eternal and unalterable (Ibid). Ethnic groups are classified with qualities like gender,
race, ethnicity, nationality, class, and sexual orientation (Hirschfield 1996; Mason 1994; Solomons
and Back 1994). In turn, the qualities listed above hold social meaning, giving cues to individuals
inside and outside of a specific ethnic group. Racism, and other forms of oppression which create
divisions in groups of people, are preserved by essentialism (Van Dijk 1987). Campbell, in 1958,
theorized that prejudice-based belief systems are the foundation for differences between ethnic
groups. These ethnic groups are identified by perceptions of a coherent and unified entity, which
is linked to a belief that there is some sort of underlying essence gluing these groups together
(Yzerbyt, Corneille, and Estrada 2001; McGartey et al. 1996).
To most essentialists, ethnicity is stationary and cannot be changed. Furthermore, the
essentialist view of ethnicity may give a basis for keeping ethnic groups locked into their normally
seen categories (Yzerbyt, Rocher, Schadron 1997). Ethnic groups represent types of people, they
specify that the individuals in an ethnic group are, “fundamentally a particular sort of person”
(Malipula 2014, 58). Essentialists paint ethnicity into the same box as classism, racism, and other
oppressive characteristics; meaning ethnicity leads to conflict and division (Ibid). This could have
troubling implications for the future of Tanzanian politics.
Instrumentalism

According to instrumentalism, ethnicity is produced by “political, social, and historical
situations and interests which are not necessarily genealogical or cultural (Trurton 1994). Erickson
agreed in 1993 when he stated that ethnicity is a relationship between different groups. These
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groups have members who declare that they are a group of people and are recognized by
others. An ethnic group then shares political, historical, organizational, and symbolic criteria
(Eriksen 2002). Instrumentalist scholars fundamentally disagree with essentialism due to the
simple question of whether ethnic identities and groups do change over-time (Fukui and Markakis
1994). Instrumentalists argue that the essence of ethnicity can be warped and molded by leaders
to serve their interests (Brass 1991). Thus, the very ethnicity and ethnic groups of those involved
is accounted for in the handiwork of elites. Because ethnicity can be manipulated, instrumentalists
view ethnicity as flexible and most certainly constructed. Instrumentalists also believe that ethnic
identity is not intrinsically valuable; rather, it is a façade for political and economic interests
(Varshney 2007).
In Africa specifically, Gentili sees ethnicity as a more modern structure due to colonialism;
essentially, groups of people were manipulated to help European economic and political interests
(Gentili 2005). Ethnic exploitation includes but is not limited to creating new ethnic groups, the
combination of groups, or the reduction of them, such as in Rwanda during Belgian colonization
(Illife 1979; Mpangala 1994; Weber 2010). British colonial rule came to Tanzania only after World
War One, before then, Tanzania was ruled by Germany. German colonial rule classified Tanzanian
citizens into different ethnic groups; educated Muslims from the coast who spoke Swahili, called
maakida, governed these ethnic groups. The maakida were not local leaders from local ethnic
groups. British colonial rule differed; they replaced the maakida with local ethnic leaders because
the maakida had adversely affected local tribal customs, reducing them. German rule had increased
national feelings instead of ethnic feelings, a trend which British administration sought to change
(Weber 2010).
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Social Constructivism

The social constructivist school of ethnicity is a combination of essentialism and the
instrumentalist approach to ethnic identity. The principle difference between the groups is that
social constructivists judge that essentialism and instrumentalism do not consider historical events
that may reshape the identity of groups and individuals (Malipula 2014, 56). Ethnicity in social
constructivism is not unaltered. Instead, the shared history of a group and individuals work in
conjunction with political, economic, and cultural components to form part of a niche that affects
ethnic identity. Hence, ethnic identity in Africa is based on the foundation of “socioeconomic
processes informing and identifying people’s ethnic belonging (Malipula 2014, 56). Ethnicity in
Africa as we see it today was shaped through colonial and postcolonial processes; these ethnic
groups are at the same time amalgamations of old and new identities. Current ethnic identities are,
“both [a] modern construction and age-old cultural expressions” (Chabal 2009; Chaba and Daloz
1999; Berman 1998; Malipula 2014, 56).
Another aspect of the social constructivist approach to ethnic identity is that ethnic identity
is “being negotiated and constructed daily” through interaction among individuals in and outside
of ethnic groups (Isajiw 1993; Malipula 2014, 56). The process of changing ethnicity is continually
being manipulated and molded. Thus, it is difficult to determine when a group of individuals can
become an ethnic group. Perhaps, this vision of ethnic groups is so alterable that the identities
become less meaningful.
Institutionalism

The main idea behind institutionalism in comparative politics is that political institutions
explain cleavages in multi-ethnic societies (Varshney 2007). The design of political institutions is
important, whether the institutions are designed as proportionally representative, first-past-thepost systems, federal, or unitary systems. The differences between institutions help explain the
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fluidity of identities depending on institutional background (Ibid). Institutions appropriate for
homogenous societies are distinct from appropriate institutions; consequently, ethnically diverse
societies need political institutions noticeably distinct from undivided societies (Ibid). John Stuart
Mill argued that for democracies to be functional common loyalties must exist in the citizenry;
however, in an ethnically diverse society there are most likely going to be conflicting loyalties.
Mill predicts diverse ethnic groups would need to be brought to heel under one ethnic group, an
ethnic group that is more advanced politically. This would then force the smaller, less advanced
groups under the guidance of the more advanced group, creating civic consciousness and driving
the society toward a common point instead of driving ethnic groups inward (Mill 1990).
Lijphart argued for consociationalism, where elites decide political and cultural decisions
(Lijphart 1977). Horowitz disagreed, instead suggesting that electoral systems would force
political parties to appeal across ethnic lines, not create enduring inter-group violence (Horowitz
1985). These ideas apply to only national-level institutions, and if institutional theory is relevant
at the regional and local level then the institutions must vary at the local and regional level
(Varshney 2007).
New developments in the institutionalist literature contend that local variation in conflict
can be determined by the presence of local civic organizations, such as political parties, and
whether or not political parties integrate differing ethnic groups into their party structure (Varshney
2002). There is a new focus on how institutions influence identity choice. In the 1960s and 1970s
when consociationalism was developed essentialist views of identity were popular Lijphart
assumed that ethnic identities were fixed and political institutions were built based on fixed
identities (Lijphart 2001). Work from Posner (2005) discussed later in this paper shows how ethnic
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identities are malleable due to institutional changes. Identity choice in institutionalism is a
dependent variable for explanation (Chandra 2004; Laitin 1998).
In the current institutionalist literature constructivism and institutionalism are
interconnected. One aspect of constructivism is that identity formation takes time and is
consequently sticky, while institutionalism is more fluid, and identities will vary based on
“institutional context” (Varshney 2007). Daniel Posner shows how during Zambian colonial
history British rule institutionalized two identities: linguistic identity and tribal identity, however,
the modern choice between language and tribal identity is determined based on whether or not
Zambia has a one-party or multiparty electoral system (Posner 2005). The connection between
social constructivism and institutionalism and their effect on identity formation and identity
choices are ripe for further research.
In summary, currently, no scholars argue that ethnic identity is unchangeable like
essentialism argues, or that ethnicity is only used as a tool, as seen in instrumentalism.
Institutionalism is the method of inquiry currently used. The next section outlines the relevant
literature on ethnic identities, specifically, how identity may change through, political institutions,
economic development, and conflict. The subsequent section overviews the literature on political
competition and introduces political competition as a causal mechanism that links political
institutions, economic development, and conflict on the one hand and changes in identities on the
other hand.

How Do Ethnic Identities Change?
Identity matters because it is “among the most normatively significant and behaviorally
consequential aspect of politics” (Smith 2002, 302). Identity is significant in politics because
identity influences what individuals want and gives individuals a shared purpose (Abdelal 2009;
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Gutmann 2003). In politics, identity as a political actor, elite, or constituent influences what
individuals want out of politics as well as what they will do to obtain what matters. Identity
represents how an actor understands themselves through their interactions with distinct individuals
who may be dissimilar (Fearon 1999). Consequently, the understanding of oneself comes from
interaction among actors in political and social spheres (Abdelal 2009).
Social identity in each community revolves around two important processes: the process,
which generates the menu of people’s identity options, and the process by which the choices from
this menu are made. Furthermore, the context that a person finds themselves in affects their
conscious decision-making process about what identity will work best in each situation; in short,
social identities are “multidimensional” (Chandra 2006; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010;
Horowitz 1985; McLaughlin 2007; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999). Identities are context-dependent.
Ethnicity is an important branch of identity, where one’s membership in that identity group
is based off attributes related to descent. Furthermore, ethnic identities are characterized by
constrained change and visibility (Chandra 2006). Descent-based attributes “are acquired
genetically, through cultural and historical inheritance” (Chandra 2006, 400). Alternatively,
certain descent-based attributes are acquired during life as a sign of inheritance, like a name or
tribal markings (Ibid). Horowitz argues that the traits found in ethnicity are believed to be innate
(Horowitz 1985). This would suggest that the traits found in ethnicity are stable and do not change
much. Yet ethnic identities will change due to circumstance, although the changes that do occur to
ethnicity are still constrained by foundational attributes (Chandra 2006).
The academic literature debates the extent to which ethnic division affects the relationship
between individuals in the state. Ethnic differences have been shown to have an adverse effect on
political stability and economic performance of states (Easterly and Levine 1997; Cederman and
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Girardin. 2007). However, recent experimental work in Kenya, found little evidence that
preferential treatment, known as coethnic bias, is the mechanism behind the negative relationship
between ethnic diversity and poor state performance (Berge et al. 2015). Based on recent advances
in the institutionalist tradition of inquiry; I conclude that the question of whether ethnic diversity
leads to certain state outcomes misses the process by which ethnic identities are formed. Instead,
one should ask, which policies and/or institutions are more likely to create polarized ethnic or other
identities in a given society (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). The remainder of this section discusses
the academic literature outlining political institutions, economic development, violent conflict as
independent variables and their effect on political competition as a causal mechanism that
influences identity.
Political Institutions

Daniel Posner defines institutions as a political system that constrains elites and non-elites
in society (Posner 2005). Institutions constrain actors because “institutions are the formal rules,
regulations, and policies that build social and political interactions” (Posner 2005, 2). Ideas,
interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences (Moravcsik 1997).
Posner adds, “The ethnic identities that people use to define who they are can often be traced to
specific state policies, regulations, and administrative structures: that is, to institutions” (Posner
2005, 11).
Individuals have different identities that draw from institutions. Posner uses examples from
Zambia to show that incentives for Africans to invest in their identities as tribe members were
derived from colonial institutions. In Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, the British South African
Company made deals with traditional chiefs to tax the areas under their control. Colonial policies
gave individuals incentives to identify with a tribal identity because without access to a tribe and

27

chief that were recognized by the state, an individual would not receive resources available through
the colonial power. Posner theorizes that tribal identification should be stronger when members of
the tribe have an official native authority figure. He found that 58% of tribes that had native
authorities increased in population size (Posner 2005, 38). Conversely, 77% of tribes that did not
have native authorities decreased in size (Posner 2005, 27-38). Tribes that did not have official
native authorities did not have access to state resources, so individuals would switch tribes for
access to limited resources. In this case, the institutional change had an unintended effect on
individual identity. Though individuals did switch tribes to gain access to resources, thereby
changing their identity, the change in identity was an unintended consequence of the change in
tribal institutions.
Only certain ethnic groups can engage in the political competition due to size. Ethnic
groups must be large enough to command sufficient political power. Ethnic identification should
be stronger in and among ethnic groups that are larger. Additionally, members of ethnic groups
that are politically relevant will be politically mobilized to obtain access to scarce resources and
have greater internal expectations to identify ethnically (Posner 2004b).
While all African states have constitutions, laws, and rules that limit presidential power,
scholars generally agree that state institutions previously had little actual effect on constraining
leaders’ actions in African states. However, this has changed in the last four decades. Institutions
seem to constrain African leaders more now than 50 years ago. Posner and Young found “three
quarters of the African leaders who left power in the 1960s and 1970s did so through a coup,
violent overthrow, or assassination” (Posner and Young 2007,129). Contrast this with the period
between 2000 and 2005 where leaders leaving power through violent means fell to 19% (Ibid).
African institutions have become increasingly powerful in constraining leader choices. In
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the past, violence meant forced changes in political power; now political power changes in concert
with institutional rules. A leader’s desire to remain in power has most likely not changed. Instead,
formal rules of the state check leader ambitions (Posner and Young 2007). This suggests that
formal rules and policies altered the identities of African leaders such that remaining in power
through disobeying the formal rules and regulations of the state is no longer an acceptable.
The governing style of elites when formalized in the policies and laws of the state is an
additional insight into how institutions affect identity. During the post-colonial period, Tanzanian
president Julius Nyerere intended to change Tanzanian identity. Nyerere “forcefully downplayed
the role of ethnic affiliation in public life and instead emphasized a single Tanzanian national
identity” (Miguel 2004).
Rather than playing the ethnic card to gain supporters, Nyerere emphasized national
identities. TANU, founded by Nyerere, felt its job was to “fight tribalism and any other factors
which would hinder the development of unity among Africans” (Miguel 2004, 337). In addition to
playing the nationalist card, President Nyerere emphasized the ethnically nonaligned Kiswahili as
the national language, encouraged civic education in school, and disassembled traditional tribal
authorities (Miguel 2004, 338). Nyerere felt these reforms would build a national identity in place
of the former ethnic identities. We see the effects of these reforms in the high national identity, as
recorded in the Afrobarometer dataset. By emphasizing a state identity, Nyerere and TANU
modified the rules of the state, ultimately securing greater political power. Single party rule
changed institutions, emphasizing national identity in Tanzania, consequently, it is expected that
multi-party elections will lead to another shift.
Economic Development
Modernization Theory

There are two competing schools of thought concerning modernization and its effects on
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national and ethnic identity in Africa: classic modernization theory and second-generation
modernization theory. Classic modernization theory argues that urbanization, universal education,
mass media, and industrialization help raise levels of national identification over ethnic
identification (Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1964; Weber 1979; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983).
Urbanization breaks ties to tribal homelands and brings individuals together where they interact
with citizens from different ethnic backgrounds. Education and increased media access increase
national identification by cultivating a common language and a common shared history over ethnic
histories. Industrialization leads to a decline in subsistence agricultural practices and encourages a
monetary economy wherein individuals rely less on ethnic networks and more on a national
backdrop. A cross-national study of African states supports classic modernization theory
(Robinson 2014).
Modernization Theory emphasizes processes like urbanization, education, and
industrialization, which are distinct from each other. The processes emphasized by modernization
theory may be a function of change in political institutions, since a new regime could try new
development programs, for instance. Yet, it is also possible that the same political regime to create
higher levels of urbanization and education.
Second Generation Modernization Theory

In contrast to these arguments, other scholars propose second-generation modernization
theory, arguing that increased ethnic identification is a result of political and economic
modernization (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Certain scholars advocating for secondgeneration modernization theory propose that ethnic categories, in the contemporary sense, exist
in response to modernization (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Connor 1972; Calhoun 1993).
Competition over new resources that stem from modernization, like jobs, schools, and clinics,
encourage ethnic identification over national identification. Gaining access to resources like these
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is difficult since the national government controls those resources. Ensuring constant access to
these resources requires building a coalition that wins the presidency or building a coalition that
can apply pressure on the president (Posner 2004b). This creates more fragmented societies and
less national unanimity (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1983; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).
Violent Conflict

At the end of the Cold War, many explanations for conflict centered on ethnic nationalism.
After controlling for variables like per capita income and economic growth, Fearon and Laitin
(2003) find that countries with high ethnic and/or religious diversity do not experience more civil
war, “rather the conditions that favor insurgency” give better explanations for why ethnically
diverse states experience civil war. Today, conflict is no longer viewed as a function of ethnic
diversity, but instead as a driver of change in identities.
Political competition serves as a causal link between violent conflict and identity shift.
Elites use political rhetoric in response to conflict to encourage individuals to change their identity
for protection or access to resources that will help their survival during the conflict. Past conflict
may affect identities in the present. Historic pre-colonial conflict is correlated with lower levels of
trust, a stronger sense of ethnic identity, and a weaker sense of national identity (Besley and Rynal
Querol 2014). Historical conflict negatively correlates with patterns of development (Ibid). It is
also possible that political rhetoric invokes past conflict to preserve political power (Fearon and
Laitin 2000). In Tanzania, Kiswahili culture became associated with resisting German colonialism
through “armed and moral resistance” (Geiger 2005, 281). Later when Nyerere emphasized
Kiswahili in schools and as the official state language, he was building upon old connections and
togetherness that are built through common identities.
Identity shift in civil wars occurs due to territorial control through the reinforcement of
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prewar cleavages between groups or the creation of new ethnic differences that are based on the
conflict itself (Kalyvas 2006). Violence leads to identity shift and ethnic defection through the
creation of additional dimensions to one’s identity. Identity shift is when individuals acquire “a
new ethnic (or national) identity that replaces the old one, and the result of identity shift is
assimilation” (Alba and Nee 2003; Wimmer 2007).
Additional dimensions to one’s identity are calculated and instrumental decisions, not
whims. Individual motivations for engaging in defection also vary: coercion, opportunism and
revenge are all possibilities (Branch 2007; Anderson 2005). As identities change, or not, the
individuals who hold that identity have a built in-group that allows access to benefits through
collective action (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Kalyvas 2008). In summary, political elites may
intentionally or unintentionally manipulate identities to increase their chances of winning an armed
conflict.
Political Competition as a Causal Mechanism

Political institutions, economic modernization, and violent conflict influence political
competition among elites. Language and culture are also important, but these are part of an
individual's identity. Since language and culture are part of existing identities, they are also subject
to change through institutions, modernization, and violent conflict, as well as capture by elites
through political competition. If, for example, someone running for office can build a larger
coalition by using language as a polarizing issue, then that part of identity is subject to capture by
politicians. These independent variables— political institutions, economic modernization, and
violent conflict—working through political competition as the causal mechanism directly shape
and reshape identities.
The political competition literature is broken up into two sections. First, elites will appeal
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to ethnic identities to mobilize their supporters to win elections (Bates 1983; Horowitz 1985;
Chandra 2004; McCauley and Wilkinson 2006). Second, constituents will vote for political parties
and candidates that are from the same ethnic group because they know that a coethnic politician
will channel goods to their ethnic supporters, known as “ethnic favoritism” (Ferree and Horowitz
2010; Van de Walle 2007). Consistent with both traditions, a recent cross-national study found
that “ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened by exposure to political competition” (Eifert,
Miguel, and Posner, 2010).
Ethnic group size is instrumental in predicting salient political cleavages. Elites expect that
constituents are likely to identify with ethnic groups that are large enough to be politically useful
in political competition (Posner 2004b). If constituents belong to smaller groups that are not
politically useful in obtaining goods and services, the incentive would be to reevaluate their
identity and join a group that is based on other identity dimensions, such as class, religion, or
occupation (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Candidates may emphasize ethnicity if it will serve
them the best in obtaining the necessary votes for office (Ibid). However, African voters do not
make their choices solely based on ethnic considerations (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012).
Unemployment, inflation, and income distribution all effect voter perception of government
effectiveness (Ibid).
Posner again found that the transition from one-party to multiparty rule changed political
competition in Zambia and Kenya. The political system itself creates context that affects the
identities that people define themselves along concerning voting and politics (Posner 2007).
Political competition in a one-party system creates different incentives for individuals to identify
than a multi-party system does. In a single-party system, individuals define themselves in “small
localized groups.” Religion, language, and region are common axes of individual identity in
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multiparty African politics (Ibid). The change away from single party systems alters institutions,
changing the confines of political competition. This allows new cleavages to modify identities and
act as a means for new political competition (Ibid).
Other literature finds that political competition increases the salience of ethnic
identification in Africa, as ethnic identities were more salient over national identities when
competitive elections are close (Gadjanova 2017). Gadjanova thus shows identification shifting in
relation to short-term electoral cycles. Furthermore, the increased salience of ethnic identities and
decrease in identification with national identities works in conjunction with “heightened
perceptions of ethnically-motivated discrimination, status anxieties and lower levels of inter-ethnic
trust closer to nationally-competitive elections in particular” (Gadjanova 2017, 1).
Is it possible that multiparty elections introduced in 1992 increased political competition
along ethnic lines in Tanzania, thus leading to a decline in national identification? While answering
this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, I suggest a few aspects of Tanzanian political
system on which future research may want to focus: the law that prohibits political parties from
campaigning along ethnic lines in Tanzania (Fisher 2012). The rhetoric that political parties use in
Tanzania during the electoral campaigns, and the regional concentration of votes in recent
elections.
Tanzanian law prohibits campaigning along ethnic lines, and new political parties must
have members from a minimum of ten regions. Two of those regions must be from Zanzibar. It is
possible that we might see regional support for political parties rather than ethnic support. Certain
parties remain stronger in specific regions, like CUF in Zanzibar and Pemba and CHADEMA in
Arusha and Kilimanjaro. Especially if a specific ethnic group or groups make up the majority of
the population in a given region, regional support may be a stand in for ethnicity (Fisher 2012).
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Tanzania did experience a large institutional change in the early 1990s from a single-party
to a multi-party electoral system. There have not been instances of civil war in Tanzania, but an
examination of the ACLED dataset reveals that there is an increase in riots, protests, and violence
against civilians in Tanzania between 2005 and 2015 (Clionadh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen 2010).
Conflict could act as an intervening variable rather than an independent variable on its own. In this
case, the change in institutions allowing multiple parties may lead to violent conflict between the
parties, or between parties and the government as the newer parties and individuals may express
their discontent with one another or the political system in which they operate through violent acts.
Finally, if in the past decade urbanization, formal education, and industrialization declined,
then classic modernization theory would be consistent with the Tanzanian case. Second generation
modernization theory may be consistent with events in Tanzania if modernization measures
increased in the past decade, along with ethnic identification.
Table 1 summarizes the possible independent variables and causal mechanism that may
lead to changes in identity.
Table 1
IV

Causal Mechanism

DV

Change in political institutions

Political Competition

Identity Shift

Economic modernization3

Political Competition

Identity Shift

Violent conflict

Political Competition

Identity Shift

To sum up, political competition is a causal mechanism that links political institutions,
economic development, and conflict on the one hand and shifts in identities on the other hand.

3

Economic modernization may produce changes towards greater national, classical
modernization theory, and towards greater ethnic identification with second-generation
modernization theory.
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Political competition manifests as elite mobilization of supporters to win elections, as well as the
expectation that co-ethnics will channel resources to their supporters, known as ethnic favoritism.
Individuals tend to join the group that gives them the most access to resources. Competitive
elections, crackdowns on free speech, increased protests, and change in rhetoric due to perceived
discrimination are potential indicators that changes to Tanzania’s institutions have increased
political competition, which in turn may have led to a decline in national identity. Process tracing
methodology—described in the following section—can help track and record the changes in
Tanzanian political competition.

Proposed Methodology
To uncover the causes behind the change in identity in Tanzania, I will process trace the
events of the last ten years. I will identify which of the independent variables described by the
literature drive the changes of identity in Tanzania. The following sources will be helpful while
conducting my case study, but are not limited to The Citizen, a leading Tanzanian newspaper, the
Tanzanian Office of Statistics, Journal of Modern African Studies, Africa Review, The Economist,
and African Bulletin.
Process tracing is a qualitative method of case study that helps identify variables that may
have been otherwise overlooked (because they are new, for instance). Importantly for this study,
process tracing can be used to “make inferences [about] which causal mechanisms may have been
at work” (Bennett 2004; Mahoney 2012; George and Bennett 2005).
Process tracing “focuses on whether the intervening variables between a hypothesized
cause and observed effect move as predicted by the theories under investigation” (Bennett 2004,
22). My goal is to determine which possible explanation is more likely responsible for the proposed
hypothesis and the effect seen in the real world (Ibid).
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Confirmation bias is a common mistake when conducting process tracing, because it can
lead to selection of cases and variables that may be incorrect. Additionally, interpretation of the
evidence found in the case can be influenced by confirmation bias, because a researcher needs to
avoid at all costs viewing the evidence only through the lens that confirms their view of events.
Other researchers studying the same case may come to very different conclusions that may
contradict one case study. To ward off potential confirmation bias, a researcher should question a
wide array of other variables and explanations in a case and conduct methodical process tracing
while considering the alternatives (Bennett 2004, 41).
Case studies do lack the representativeness that comes from large N statistical studies,
reducing the ability to make inferences about more cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 124127). Researchers who use case study methods are not selecting cases that are representative of
large populations, nor do they intend to make claims that apply to larger populations (McKeowen
1999). Instead, the interest behind case studies is viewing specific outcomes and the conditions
under which the causal mechanism generated those outcomes (Bennett 2004, 43). Case studies
exchange generalizability for specificity. The goal of case studies is theory development, not
inference about patterns across cases.
Political competition may be a causal mechanism that encourages the shift towards ethnic
identity shift in Tanzania. Causal mechanisms are “structures that operate in specific contexts to
generate the phenomena that we observe in the physical or social world” (Bennett 2004, 35).
Process tracing helps the researcher examine the assumed sequence of events that a theory and the
producing factors hypothesized should have taken place in the case study. After this process, it
should be clear whether the variables in the case were relevant as described. Thereby determining
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whether the hypothesized interpretation should or should not be ruled out as an explanation for the
case (Bennett 2004, 36).
Four tests help researchers apply process tracing, and the researcher must ask if the
evidence found can pass the four tests. Is the evidence “necessary and/or sufficient for accepting
the inference?” (Collier 2011, 825). The four tests are straw-in-the wind, hoop, smoking gun, and
doubly decisive (Ibid). Straw-in-the-wind tests boost the validity of a hypothesis or may raise
doubts about the same hypotheses, but straw-in-the-wind tests are not conclusive on their own:
they are still important tools. For example, if a hypothesis passes various straw-in-the-wind tests,
positive supporting evidence to a study and hypothesized causal inference is gained (Collier 2011).
Hoop tests are harder to pass and are consequently more demanding when examining the
evidence. To pass the hoop test, the proposed hypotheses “must jump through the hoop” (Collier
2011, 826). Although passing the hoop test does not confirm the hypothesis on its own, it
“establishes a necessary criterion.” Nevertheless, a hoop test is not sufficient for complete approval
(Collier 2011, 827). While using a hoop test, the researcher must ask if the piece of evidence under
consideration meets the conditions that must exist for the outcome in the historical event (Mahoney
2012, 575). If evidence passes the hoop test, it lends greater support and increases the chances that
the hypothesis is correct (Mahoney 2012).
Smoking-gun tests evoke the idea of being caught red handed with a still smoking gun after
having used it to commit a crime. If one is holding a smoking gun at the scene of a crime, then the
individual is probably guilty. On the other hand, if there is no smoking gun, it does not necessarily
mean that an individual is not guilty (Collier 2011). In this way, a smoking-gun test can confirm a
hypothesis, but it does not necessarily fail a hypothesis if the smoking gun test is not met. Some
causes and the outcomes that follow that cause must exist for the evidence to show in favor of the
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proposed hypotheses. Therefore, if the researcher can describe this clearly to their audience that
the necessary cause and effect exist, the smoking-gun test lends “a sufficient but not necessary
criterion for accepting the causal inference” (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012; Van Evra 1997).
The doubly-decisive test contributes strong support for the proposed hypotheses, which
also eliminates other competing hypotheses. A doubly-decisive test meets the necessary and
sufficient criteria for determining causation (Collier 2011). True doubly decisive tests are
uncommon, but the researcher can combine multiple tests that can then support one hypothesis and
exclude others (Collier 2011; Bennett 2010, 211).
In this section, I have reviewed process tracing as a qualitative method of case study, which
allows researchers to make inferences about which variables are responsible for the observed
changes in the phenomena of interest. I also discussed why process tracing can assist in the
identification of causal mechanisms through four tests: straw-in-the wind, hoop, smoking gun, and
doubly-decisive tests. Future research should examine all aspects of political competition in
Tanzania applying these four tests to determine whether the increased political competition is
responsible for the observed decline in national identity there.

Preliminary Findings
Robinson notes that Tanzania is an outlier due to its “high degree of national identification
relative to ethnic identification” and in its terms of the “relationship between income and national
identification” (Robinson 2014). This means Tanzania has very high levels of national
identification and a low level of economic development. This is due to the nationalization efforts
of President Nyerere; while he also intended economic modernizing in the country, it failed. The
failure of economic modernization led to the change in multiparty politics, which in turn led to
political competition. Political competition coupled with still-low economic development has then
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led toward Tanzanians beginning to identify more with their ethnic identities than the national
identity. It could potentially be the case that Tanzania, due to its unique history of nation building,
is a case consistent with the predictions of the Second Generation Modernization theory.
Bennett notes that the study of a deviant or outlier case can “help inductively identify
variables and hypotheses that have been left out of existing theories” (Bennett 2004, 30).
Tanzanian national identification is an outlier in East Africa, as is clear from the Afrobarometer
survey. Even now, Tanzanian national identification remains higher than other states in the region.
Only Mozambique approaches its level in 2015 with 52.7% of individuals surveyed replying that
they identify only nationally. Mozambique aside, Tanzania is an outlier due to its high national
identification and low economic development, which makes the research question articulated in
this essay even more important.
In Tanzania, the proportion of the population that trusted the president “a lot” decreased
from 80% in 2005 to 47.3% in 2015. This may be indicative of a change in institutions and political
competition.

Figure 7a. 2005: Tanzania Trust in President

Figure 8a. 2005 Party Competition Leads to Conflict

Figure 7b. 2015 Tanzania Trust in President

Figure 8b. 2015 Party Competition Leads to Conflict
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However, Figure 8a shows that in 2005, 40% of Tanzanians surveyed felt that party
competition often leads to conflict, while in 2015 this number fell to 29.4%. In 2005, 33.5% of
Tanzanians surveyed felt that party competition rarely leads to conflict. In 2015, this increased to
47.7%. This change in public opinion suggests that Tanzanians do not view competition among
multiple parties as a potential cause of conflict, which is distinct from the dependent variable I
propose here, which is shift in identity.
Figure 9a. 2005 Approval of One Party Rule

Figure 9b. 2015 Approval of One Party Rule

In Tanzania, the proportion of the population that strongly approved of one-party rule
decreased from 25.1% in 2005 to 8.9% in 2015. Strong disapproval of one-party rule increased
from 24% in 2005 to 43.2% in 2015. This change suggests that Tanzanians are embracing the
multiparty electoral system.
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In short, these numbers are consistent with change in political institutions, which created
incentives for political competition that may have altered the salience of national identity in
Tanzania. Future research should examine the rhetoric of elites during political campaigns, the
descriptions of political competition in Tanzanian media, as well as recruitment, and voting
patterns in the country to draw a conclusion about whether political competition is responsible for
the identity shift in Tanzania.

Conclusion
Posner (2004) finds that changes in political systems, the institutions of the state, influence
the identities in a society through political competition. Gadjanova (2017) finds that when political
competition is high, ethnic anxiety increases and inter-ethnic trust decreases, and these changes
occur as a function of electoral cycles. Political competition influences identity and politics in
African states, however, we do not know at this point whether this is the mechanism responsible
for the identity shift in Tanzania.
This thesis argues that political competition may serve as a causal mechanism that operates
as part of political institutions, economic modernization, or conflict. By conducting process tracing
of Tanzanian electoral campaigns, I will establish what determinant or combination of
determinants—institutions, economic modernization, or conflict—created incentives for political
competition to alter identity in Tanzania between 2005 and 2015.
Understanding why a shift in identity has occurred, or is under way, in Tanzania is important
for future researchers and policymakers, as Tanzania is a unique state on the African continent.
Although Tanzanian national identity remains the highest in East Africa, the decrease in national
identity deserves attention, as years of nation building that led to high levels of national identity
and relative peace may be threatened.
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